Health Maintenance
Organizations Federal Policy Lawrence Meyer, &dquo;Health Plans Grew in Seven Years, But Not as Much as Expected,&dquo; Washington Post 101:7a January 3, 1978 When President Nixon gave his unqualified endorsement to Health Maintenance Organizations in 1971, it seemed that a historic moment had arrivedthe federal government throwing its full weight behind a restructuring of the way Americans receive their medical care.
But summer dreams give way to winter realities. Seven years later, a combination of dogged opposition by the American Medical Association, presidential politics, strong demands by HMO supporters and the normal resistance of the bureaucracy to change have combined to limit the development of potentially money-saving Health Maintenance Organizations to a level far below what had initially been envisioned.
The Nixon Administration first announced its intention to submit legislation to help HMOs develop across the country with the stated goal of giving 90 percent of the American people a chance to join an HMO by 1980. By 1976, there were to be 40 million persons in 1,700 HMOs across the country.
By the end of 1977, however, only about 6.5 million persons were enrolled in 165 HMOs. The numbers have increased since Nixon's decision to back the prepaid medical movement back in 1971, but slowly and far less than the Administration had projected.
By 1976, when the promise of major federal help for HMOs had clearly faded, one knowledgeable observer, Harvard Fellow Paul Starr, wrote: &dquo;While HMOs in various forms continue to grow in communities around the country, they no longer represent a major element in federal health policy. Politically, they have fallen victim not to new arguments or new evidence, but to a mixture of perserverance among their opponents, overzealousness among their friends, special pleading in Congress, and indifference within the Administration. Out of these influences has come internally incoherent legislation, presumably in-tended to stimulate the development of prepaid plans, but in fact something of an impediment to their growth.&dquo;
What is so striking in the history of federal policy toward HMO is that at the same time concern grows over the increasing cost of medical care, the evidence continues to come in that properly managed Health Maintenance Organizations can provide comprehensive, quality medical care at a lower cost than the prevailing fee-for-service system. Officials in the Carter Administration now are promising to rescue the HMO movement with more federal aid and attention, changes in the law and by encouraging support from private business, but few now believe that HMOs can grow as quickly as the Nixon Administration suggested they would seven years ago.
The Nixon Administration's proposal to help HMOs get started was a major departure for American government. Unlike the Johnson Administration, which had gotten medical care for the aged (Medicare) passed by promising not to tamper with the structure of medical care delivery, the Nixon proposal was intended to do just that -alter the way Americans received medical treatment. &dquo;The toughest question we face, then, is not how much we should spend but how we should spend it,&dquo; Nixon said in his 1971 message to Congress. &dquo;It must be our goal not merely to finance a more expensive medical system but to organize a more efficient one.&dquo;
The HMO legislation did not fly through Congress. It proceeded slowly. Sen. Edward 1~~I. Kennedy, ( D-Mass. ) chairman of the Senate Labor Committee health subcommittee, came up with a bill of his own to spend $5.1 billion over three years to subsidize establishment of HMOs.
In the meantime, the American Medical Association had gone to work on the administration. With the presidential campaign in full swing and with the Committee for the Reelection of the President raising money for a record-breaking campaign, American doctors were in a position to make their displeasure known. And many American doctors were displeased.
The opposition of American physicians to the concept of prepaid practice was deeply rooted. The heart of the Health 8Maintenance Organization is the salaried physician, who is paid from funds gathered from a flat fee paid by patients in advance of treatment. The position of the AMA in the past had beena position still held in some localities -that receiving a salary rather than a fee-for-service performed was unethical on the part of a physician.
Despite the initial enthusiasm shown by the White House for HMO, presidential support for the legislation waned. Asked what turned the White House around, former HEW Under Secretary Veneman said in an interview, &dquo;The election, to be very blunt. The White House during that period slowed down on any social legislation... I think the AMA was using its leverage on every issue they were involved with.... The 1972 presidential campaign gave the AMA an inside opportunity to influence national health care policy. Dr. Malcolm Todd, a California surgeon who had served as Nixon's personal physician and who would later be president of the AMA, was chairman of the Physicians Committee for the Reelection of the President.
Todd told John K. Iglehart, the highly respected health reporter for the National Journal, that physicians were upset following a meeting with then Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Elliott L. ject. Speaking about the Administration's bill, Todd said, &dquo;We used all the force we could bring to bear against this. As a result, there is no question that there has been some backtracking on the part of the White House. The White House has directed the Secretary (Richardson) to slow down on this thing... The Secretary has called off the aggressiveness and this is good.&dquo; When the Nixon Administration came back to Congress in 1973 with its proposal, it was a watered-down version of Nixon's earlier unqualified endorsement. By then, however, Congressional initiatives by Democrats in both houses had eclipsed the White House effort.
In addition to the cooled ardor of the Nixon Administration, supporters of HMO legislation were having trouble getting a bill sponsored by Reps. William D. Roy (D-Kan.) and Paul G. Rogers (D-Fla.) to the House floor because House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee chairman Harley O. Staggers (D-W.Va.) would not move the legislation. According to knowledgeable sources, United Mine Workers President Arnold Miller finally was asked to speak to Staggers about the bill, after which the legislation was moved quickly. But the House measure called for a more limited demonstration program while the Senate bill -passed after Kennedy scaled it down from $1.5 billion to $800 million -envisioned an ambitious program of support to develop HMOs.
The conference report chose the House approach, a demonstration program with authorized spending of $375 million, including $325 million for development of HMOs. The bill no longer gave outright grants of up to $2.5 million over a three-year period for groups that qualified. The bill also included a requirement that employers of 250 or more persons offering traditional health benefits to employes also make available an HMO if a federally qualified plan existed in the area. State laws that in effect outlawed HMOs were partially overridden.
After some talk by the White House of a veto, Nixon signed the bill on December 29, 1973. He said the legislation &dquo;will enable the federal government to help demonstrate the feasibility of the HMO concept over the next five years.&dquo;
The new law's provisions, however, posed enormous difficulties for Health Maintenance Organizations. Among other things, the bill required an Hl-I0, to be federally qualified, to offer a broader range of services than normally provided by traditional health insurance.
Legislators with particular interests attached provisions to the bill as it moved through Congress to further their own goals. As a result, the bill signed by Nixon contained a requirement that medical treatment be offered for alcohol and drug abuse -a special concern of Sen. Harold Hughes (D-Iowa). Family planning and infertility treatment was included because of Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.). Mental health benefits were added because of Kennedy and Sen. Richard S. Schweiker (R-Pa.).
The law posed other structural problems for HMOs. They were required to offer coverage at the same rate to everyone in the community where they were located. Conventional health insurance companies, like Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Aetna and Prudential can rate groups according to their claims experience so that groups with lower claims get lower premiums and groups with higher claims pay more. Alain Enthoven, an economist and a proponent of HNIOs who is now a consultant to HEW Secretary Joseph A. Califano, Jr., describes the federal government's actions over the last seven years as &dquo;the government's anti-HMO policy.&dquo;
Enthoven, in making his case, cites such items as: (1) Medicare paying more for patients using the more costly fee-for-service system than it pays for patients using HlVI0s. Because fee-for-service costs more, 8Medicare, under its cost-reimbursement formula, pays more. As the differential widens, Enthoven argues, &dquo;the subsidy becomes greater.&dquo; If the financial advantage to the patient is eliminated, Enthoven says, a patient would prefer the &dquo;comparative freedom of the fee-for-service sector&dquo; to the more limited choice given by an HMO. (2) The 30-day open enrollment requirement of the 1973 law forced HMOs to accept any applicant, regardless of health status, a requirement that conventional insurance companies do not have. (3) HEW delay in qualifying HMOs left employers hesitant to contract with an unqualified H3.IO out of concern that the federal government might qualify some other HlB10 instead, obligating the employer to offer yet another choice. (4) Planning legislation and local certificate-of-need laws put HMOs under restrictions and requirements that fee-for-service physicians do not face. (5) The federal government has actually disbursed only a fraction of the money authorized for HMOs by Congress. Actual appropriations have been well under the authorizations, an outlay over three years of $93.4 million in grants and loans in a system that spends more than $100 billion annually for health care. &dquo;Of course,&dquo; Enthoven said in a lengthy memo to Califano on the subject, &dquo;all this is not the result of some deliberate anti-HMO plot. Many of these policies are entirely reasonable when viewed from the different perspective from which they were viewed when enacted... But whatever their reasons, these policies must be changed systematically if H11'IOs are to receive a fair market test.&dquo; One supporter of HMOs described government policy in these terms: &dquo;They wrote regulations that the most successful HMOs in the country couldn't qualify under and they inhibited growth in a multitude of ways...&dquo; The speaker, HEW Under Secretary Hale Champion, promised a convention of the Group Health Association of America last summer that HEW would beef up the department's staff to cut into the backlog of applications that were coming in faster than they were being processed. Champion also promised that the department would expedite the issuance of regulations to implement HMO amendments Congress passed in 1976 to alleviate some of the problems of the original legislation....
Supporters of the HMO movement are heartened, but somewhat skeptical. Given the history of the government's actions, they are asking now for tangible evidence to support the rhetoric. When it was founded 40 years ago with just 1,000 members, the Group Health Association of Washington seemed an exciting experiment in prepaid health care by physicians employed by their patients. In those simpler times, recalled one doctor who worked for GHA back then, the physicians occasionally would end their day by going out bowling together.
HMO
But times have changed. Today, GHA has 100,000 members and is the largest Health Maintenance Organization in Washington,... It is also seriously troubled by excessive costs, internal dissension and management problems.
Two years ago, GHA was forced to raise substantially the fees its members pay and to lay off 15 percent of its staff, including doctors. Further to fight rising costs, GHA eventually had to take most of its patients out of George Washington University Hospital and move them to Doctors Hospital, which has a mixed reputation in the medical community. Because of continuing friction between GHA doctors and the organization's board of trustees, the doctors there have sought and won, for the first time in American history, National Labor Relations Board recognition as a labor union.
Big as it is, GHA also has been comparatively unsuccessful in building its membership roles. The Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, which began 10 years after GHA ... now has twice as many members as GHA and two hospitals of its own. &dquo;There's no reason why (GHA in Washington ) , properly managed, shouldn't take off and thrive,&dquo; Dr. Frank Newman, the former director of the Puget Sound cooperative said in an interview. GHA's outgoing executive director, Louis J. Segadelli, does not disagree. &dquo;Compared to the really good outfits -Kaiser and Puget Soundwe are not successful,&dquo; he acknowledged.
Some of the problems confronting GHA are difficulties that any organization founded as much out of principle as practicality faces in its second generation of leadership. Other problems of GHA, according to its officials, involve its inability to realize the full benefit of a prepaid group plan because of its lack of its own hospital and unified medical facility.
But the most vexing and troublesome problem, according to several knowledgeable persons, is the form of organization. GHA's distinguishing characteristic -active control by the membership -also is its greatest source of difficulty. GHA, according to these observers, has come to a crossroads of sorts, having to decide not only what its relationship to its physicians will be, but how much authority it will cede to the men and women it hires to run the organization. Last spring, following the annual election of members to GHA's board of trustees, the board rejected a proposal by a group of GHA physicians to form a corporation and contract with GHA for their . services. Shortly after, 12 physicians, including the medical director, resigned their administrative posts. Segadelli, the executive director, also has tendered his resignation effective next June. Segadelli has supported the physicians. He is staying on only while the hunt for his successor continues. The board is looking for a physician with managerial capabilities, according to GHA President Harold Wool....
GHA's physicians are employees of the plan. Although they are given some ability to influence decisions, final authority rests with the board. The result, according to one physician formerly on GHA's staff, is similar to what might happen &dquo;if we let Ralph Nader run General Motors.&dquo; According to this physician, Dr. Paul Lenz, the structure of GHA encourages a &dquo;civil service, nine-to-five mentality&dquo; among its physicians. &dquo;The physician becomes very concerned with what he is supposed to do with his hours,&dquo; Lenz said in an interview in New Brunswick, N.J., where he is now medical director of the Rutgers Community Health Plan, another prepaid group medical plan. &dquo;At GHA,&dquo; Lenz said, &dquo;the physician who was nasty to a patient was rewarded. He got home earlier. He had fewer appointments.&dquo;
Lenz, like others who have looked at GHA from the inside and the outside, summed up the problem with a simple observation: &dquo;The physician has to feel that he is part of the health care system. (The board) can't control the medical group. They run it, but they can't control it.&dquo;
The issue as several persons pointed out, is not over money. GHA physicians, depending upon their specialty and length of service, are paid between $32,000 and $71,000 a year. That puts them roughly in the same average range as physicians in private, fee-for-service practice.
Although he defended the quality of medical care given at GHA, a point generally conceded by all but its severest critics, Segadelli said he agreed with Lenz &dquo;on the basic point ... GHA has produced a civil service climate among its physicians.&dquo; Part of the reason for that climate, Segadelli said, is that 70 percent of GHA's members work in the civil service themselves and the physicians picked up work attitudes from their patients. The problem of the physicians' relationship to the board, Segadelli said, is &dquo;basic, no question about it.&dquo; That issue, he said, was the reason for his resignation.
Although many prepaid group medical plans hire physicians to serve as employees, the idea of physicians contracting with the health plan is not unusual. The Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, for example, contracts with the separate Permanente Medical Group which is owned and operated by physician-partners for its medical services.
Kaiser pays the medical group a fee, negotiated annually, based on the number of health plan members. Out of that fee, the medical group pays for its physicians' salaries and the support personnel needed to operate outpatient facilities. The arrangement works relatively smoothly, according to both doctors and others in the Kaiser system. Arthur Rosenbaum, chief of medicine at GHA from 1949 until 1976 said he had supported the idea of a separate corporation for the physicians. Rosenbaum, whose association with GHA began in 1940, said that it became clear in the late 1960s &dquo;that the doctors should have a clear voice in matters.&dquo; A medical council was formed, its members elected by the GHA physicians. The council dealt with pay, privileges and other matters, and negotiated annually with the board of trustees on an overall fee.
But the council was disbanded in 1976 when it became clear that the NLRB would rule it to be a violation of the National Labor Relations Act.
Rosenbaum, widely respected as a physician and a leader of other doctors at GHA, said he personally was not &dquo;enamored&dquo; of the idea of a separate organization for GHA physicians. &dquo;I was satisfied with the medical council. It suited me,&dquo; he said, emphasizing the last word. &dquo;But I recognized that it did not suit many of the younger physicians. So I went along with it for that reason.&dquo;
The board's decision to reject the physician corporation forced the doctors to try to gain a voice some other way. The idea of a labor union for the physicians, however, was generally seen as making matters worse at GHA, driving the physicians and the trustees further apart. Those who belong to GHA and persons who work for other Health Maintenance Organizations also find that the board, composed of GHA members, gets too involved with day-to-day management, usurping the authority of its staff....
Despite past and present difficulties, GHA is growing. Its president, Wool, rejects any suggestion that disagreements with physicians have affected treatment of patients. &dquo;I don't buy the argument that there is any evidence that the quality of care has suffered,&dquo; he said. Such a suggestion, he added is &dquo;unfair to the physicians.&dquo; Both Segadelli and Wool said the growth in GHA's membership -30,000 in the last five years and 5,000 new members last year -was evidence that GHA members are satisfied with the medical care they are receiving....
The one issue that almost everyone associated with GHA agrees on is that its financial difficulties would be eased considerably if it were permitted to buy or build its own hospital. But the Washington area already is seriously overbedded and GHA's repeated efforts to get a hospital of its own have not been successful.
GHA's future and continued operation is a source of concern to persons outside the organization, including some competitors. Dennis Falk, director of the George Washington University Health Plan, said, &dquo;If GHA fails to survive, it will be a disaster for the other two plans,&dquo; (George Washington's and the Georgetown University Community Health Plan). According to Falk, business persons on his board would ask how a smaller, newer plan like George Washington University's could survive if the older, far larger GHA could not. &dquo;I dread that something disastrous will happen to GHA,&dquo; he said. Despite his fears, Falk said, he thought the situation at GHA was still &dquo;salvageable.&dquo;
Wool also expressed confidence that &dquo;one way or another, we're going to work this thing out.&dquo; ... This year, the total will exceed $1 billion. Although it is a nonprofit corporation, Kaiser-Permanente is still a business, run by people who are in the business of supplying health care. Kaiser-Permanente is the largest nongovernmental supplier of health care in the United States -with more than 3 million members, 3,100 physicians, 26 hospitals with 5,700 beds and 66 medical facilities.... Although Kaiser-Permanente may not be perfect or ideal, it is the standard by which all other prepaid group health plans in the country are judged. It is universally cited by advocates of Health Maintenance Organizations as an example of what the system can deliver when given an opportunity.... Kaiser-Permanente began in the late 1930s when industrialist Henry J. Kaiser was building the Grand Coulee Dam in the state of Washington. Kaiser contracted with a young surgeon, Sydney Garfield, to provide comprehensive health care for his employees at a flat, prepaid rate.
Kaiser
The arrangement worked well enough in the early days of World War II so that when Kaiser began making steel ... and ships ... he again asked Garfield to provide medical care.
The war ended, the shipyards closed, but the medical-care program struggled along -eventually opening its membership to other groups and the general public to survive. In time, Kaiser-Permanente prospered and separated itself from Kaiser Industries, so that today employees of the industrial firm now account for less than 3 percent of the health plan's membership.
In the roughly 40 years the health plan has been operating in one form or another, the managers have developed ... principles ... that are rigidly adhered to in the operation of the system. They are:
( 1 ) Group practice. Kaiser combines under one roof the personnel and equipment needed to support a multispecialty practice, allowing physicians to consult easily with each other. (2) Integrated facilities. Kaiser attempts to locate outpatient facilities adjacent to its hospitals for the convenience of both physician and patient. (3) Prepayment and the reversal of economics. Kaiser members pay in advance for whatever medical care they may need. Physicians and hospitals, in turn, are paid a predetermined amount, which they cannot exceed in spending without suffering financially.... (4) Voluntary enrollment. Kaiser insists that when a group offers the health plan to its members, they be given an alternative. Kaiser, as one official explained, has no interest in having disgruntled members who belong because they have no choice. (5) Physician responsibility. Kaiser physicians are expected to accept responsibility for providing comprehensive care to the membership. They are not permitted to practice medicine outside the Kaiser group, although they may see fee-for-service patients who pay Kaiser. Physicians, as one official put it, are consulted on &dquo;every decision&dquo; involving operation of the plan and treatment of its members.
The relationship of the physicians to the rest of the Kaiser plan is the key. Kaiser has a central organizationthe Kaiser Foundation Health Planwhich arranges financing and provides certain administrative services to six regional plans. The regional plans are basically semiautonomous, financially independent organizations.
The Kaiser system is not a monolith. What may be standard practice in one region or one medical center may be an exception in another.
Each region has a foundation health plan, which is a nonprofit organization. There is a separate Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, a nonprofit, charitable corporation that contracts with the health plan to provide all necessary hospital services. The hospital management is almost identical to the health plan's. The hospitals, although primarily for Kaiser members, are also open to the community and to private physicians.
Medical care is provided in each of the six regions by a Permanente Medical Group ... comprising separate, independent groups of physicians. The physicians do not work for Kaiser. They are employed by the medical groups, which are partnerships ... run by the physicians themselves. The medical groups contract with the health plan in their region to supply medical care in return for a set fee per patient member that is negotiated between the health plan and the group.
Physicians, salaried employees of the group, are generally invited to become partners after three years. The medical groups share the financial risk with the health plan. Excessive laboratory tests and other procedures would reduce the medical group's income, and thus reduce the bonus payments to physicians. Excessive hospitalization could result in lower fees the following year or higher rates for members, which could result in members leaving the plan and a reduction in personnel -including physicians. &dquo;One of the important elements of the program is the responsibility of the physicians ... to participate in the whole cross-section of the program, to be aware of costs and economies throughout,&dquo; Kaiser Foundation Health Plan senior vice-president Robert J. Erickson said in an interview. &dquo;In most hospitals, for example, most of the physicians on the hospital staff have no responsibility whatsoever. Physicians contribute 70 percent of the health-care cost, but physicians in the country are responsible only for the 20 percent that goes into their pocket. In this system, they're responsible for the whole 70 percent. And that's of tremendous importance.&dquo;
. At every level of the Kaiser-Permanente organization, from the region down to the area medical facilities, the head of the health plan shares authority and responsibility with the head of the medical group.
Part of Kaiser's business approach includes detailed collection of information on hospitalization patterns, which are published monthly within each region, so that physicians and administrators can see how the system is performing.... The regional data is not the end of it.
On a quarterly basis, the central Kaiser office collects and distributes the same information for the whole system so that each region can compare its performance to the others.
However good the quality of medical care in the Kaiser system may be -and the quality of care is not a matter of controversy -Kaiser still has the kinds of problems that a patient could encounter in a private, fee-for-service system....
Where Kaiser is blamedbesides being criticized for having long waiting periods for appointments for routine physician visits -is in delivering quality care without frills. One Kaiser official, in defending the program, did not deny that a patient would not get all the attention that he or she might like. What the patient would get, the official said, is &dquo;appropriate care, the care you need.&dquo; On the other hand, Kaiser physicians and nurses assert that they are concerned with caring for patients as well as treating them....
Despite the shortcomings, the Kaiser program appears to be growing. With lower premiums in most areas than competitive plans, the membership is growing steadily. In northern California, for example, the cost of Kaiser coverage is $80.59 a month compared to $109.22 for Blue Cross-Blue Shield.
Kaiser-Permanente is only one form of HMO. In Seattle, the Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, which serves about 18 percent of the local market with its 225,000 members, is run by its membership.
The central medical and financial principles of Group Healthgroup practice, prepaymentare the same as in Kaiser. But in Group Health, the membership actually is in charge, setting the policy for management. The relationship of the physicians to the plan is less clear than in Kaiser. Physicians in Group Health do have some control over hiring, medical policy and salaries, as well as ways to affect policy and planning as it is being carried out.
What Kaiser and Group Health and other large HMOs have in common is that they are systems of health care, large enough to centralize services like laboratory work and x-rays, to purchase expensive devices where needed without having a proliferation of equipment to satisfy physicians within the system who might otherwise be concerned about losing patients.
In some instances, like open-heart surgery, Kaiser sends its members to fee-for-service surgeons and pays the bill because Kaiser officials have determined that a patient will be better served for less money than if the plan had its own capability to perform these services.
Because Whether the concept is attractive or not, Kaiser-Permanente's style, practice and habits are those of the modem business organization. &dquo;There's nothing more free enterprise, private enterprise than our program,&dquo; Dr. Cecil Cutting, former executive director of the Northern California Permanente Medical Group, said. &dquo;The medical group side of it is profit-making if we can possibly make it. The health plan and hospitals are no.nprofit, tax-exempt, and this is by design and it conserves funds for better uses than taxes. It provides more capital, more research, more benefits for the members. &dquo;The company maintains a neutral position as to which plan (HMO or traditional hospital-physician coverage) the employe should choose, but we have made the HNIO story more accessible in the last five years,&dquo; he said. &dquo;With 10 percent of our employes in HMOs, we can save $2 million annually,&dquo; he added.
People who administer HMOs say the savings come from keeping people out of hospitals.... Some of the more practical administrators consider HMOs health management organizations. They point out that the economic incentives of HMOs favor ambulatory care, and that physicians have a real interest in keeping patients out of hospitals and in making sure that hospital stays do not extend beyond strict medical necessity.
Employers like this approach because they feel it puts the physician on their side. They complain that traditional insurance coverage gives the power of the purse to a third party interested in little more than transferring payments. They also complain that independent physicians have no incentive to hurry the employe-patient back to work, and may okay longer than necessary sick leaves as a kindness to the patient. cians ; it's critical for patients and physicians. For this reason, the plan had to be organized as a separate corporate entity.&dquo; ... His first responsibilities revolved around recruiting, and precluded drawing on physicians in the immediate community because of the shortage. In addition to the usual advantages of group practice, the plan offered physicians some unique benefits, Dr. Bahnson says. &dquo;Our physicians have the normal concern about the cost of care, but they also have the opportunity to provide needed medical services in the best medical manner,&dquo; he says. &dquo;These can be services not available under other circumstances. Our decisions simply aren't circumscribed by what the patient can afford, or what the insurance company will cover.&dquo;
The plan now has six full-time and two part-time internists; five full-time and one part-time pediatricians; three obstetrician-gynecologists ; one radiologist; and a consulting pathologist. The plan also has six physician extenders. When the plan reaches its planned size of close to 30,000 members, the physician complement will be about 25, Dr.
Bahnson says.
A. J. Crutchfield, Jr., MD, immediate past president of the Forsyth County Medical Society and a private practitioner in Winston-Salem for the past 2 7 years, says the plan may well have alleviated the physician shortage problem.... He adds that so far few physicians have complained about adverse effects on their practices resulting from the plan's opening. &dquo;Some of the private pediatricians are feeling pinched,&dquo; he says....
Dr. Crutchfield remains convinced that the best way to contain medical costs is offered by traditional practice.... &dquo;Solo practice offers the most efficient means of medical care,&dquo; he says. &dquo;A private practitioner has to examine carefully the costs of his facilities and procedures.&dquo; The plan's Dr. Bahnson has been mindful of traditional medicine in the community, and has no wish to undermine it. He believes in a pluralistic system of health care delivery, and is proud of his plan's place in it....
